NICOLE ORESillIE AND THE RTEDIAEVAL ORIGIKS OF MODERN SCIENCE1
BY DANA B. DUR.ISD HISTORIANS of culture are chronically vexed by what may be called the Renaissance P r~b l e m .~ In 1860 Jakob Burckhardt established the classic concept of the period as a unique moment of creative vitality, emerging spontaneously, flourishing in isolation and disappearing without having thrust permanent roots into the soil of European culture. For two generations scholars have struggled to reconcile Burckhardt's brilliant affirmation with their own faith in the continuity of history. This effort has led in two directions, backward into the Middle Ages and forward into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The discovery of unmistakable lines of continuity in either direction has encouraged numerous attempts to redefine the Renaissance as an organic part of Western ~u l t u r e .~
In attempting to deal with this problem, especially in determining the nature of the transition from the Middle Ages -it might well be called the Burckhardt Problem -the student of cultural history may derive valuable assistance from specialists in various branches of his field. Historians of art, of political theory and of the vernacular literatures have perhaps been more successful than others in redefining that transition. Historians of philosophy and political economy are rapidly reaching new formulations. Gradually the findings of these groups of specialists are dissipating the confusion which perplexes the student of Kulturgeschichte. The outlines of a new and more acceptable synthesis are beginning to emerge.
In this general reconsideration of the Renaissance one important subject has frequently been neglected, the history of science. In part this oversight reflects the immature state of a relatively new field. To a larger extent, however, it derives from the nineteenth-century conviction that the history of science may be reduced to the chronicle of advance in the experimental and mathematical disciplines. To this advance of 'positive' knowledge, it has generally been supposed, This article is based upon a paper delivered a t the joint meeting of the History of Science Society and the American Historical Association, Chicago, Dec. %9, 1938. In preparing it I have received helpful suggestions from my student, W. S. Gifford, Jr, and my colleague, Dr G. de Santillana.
Among the numerous recent articles summarizing the status of research on this problem it will be sufficient to cite the following: H. Baron the Middle Ages -and for that matter Burckhardt's Renaissance -made no contribution. ' The inadequacy of this conception will be apparent to anyone who examines the second volume of George Sarton's monumental Introduction to the History of S~i e n c e .Ãs a result of D r Sarton's industry, we now possess a detailed and com~rehensive picture of scientific achievement during the Middle Ages in both the Christian and the non-Christian worlds. Unfortunately Dr Sarton has advanced only to 1300 in his published work; it is to be hoped that his volume on the fourteenth century will appear in the near future.
Besides Sarton's Introduction there have been two other attempts a t a large scale survey of the field: the work of Pierre Duhem and Lynn Thorndike. The historian of culture may profitably turn to each of these to further his understanding of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.
The full scope of Duhem's achievement cannot yet be measured. Twenty years after his death five of the ten volumes of his imposing Syst2me d u Monde still remain unpubli~hed.~ Presumably these volumes constitute the most extensive treatment in existence of cosmological thought during the two centuries before Copernicus. Even without them, however, it is clear from his other writings that hem was the true pioneer in this field. All future work will consist, in large measure, in working intensively the veins which he has opened. This work has already proceeded with considerable success. Critical scrutiny, indeed, has revealed that Duhem was frequently a careless, hasty searcher, over-enthusiastic in announcing some of his~discoveries, and blind to the significance of o t h e r~.~ Apart from flaws of detail, inevitable in a work of such magnitude, the chief defects in Duhem's survey may be derived from a single complex bias emerging from three aspects of his per~onality.~ We see in him a patriotic Frenchman, jealous of the 1 A trivial illustration of this view may be found in H. S. Williams, The great astronomers (New York, 1930) . Book I, 'The Old Heaven' occupies pp. 31-96; Book 111, 'The slow dawn of a new era' begins on p. 103. Between the two is inserted Book 11, 'Astronomy in the medieval period.' I t consists of the following: Chapter 1-1, The Christian world-12 centuries of progress (325-1543 A.D.) , 'From the Council of Kicaea a t which the Emperor Constantine made Europe safe for Athanasian theocracy, to the time of Copernicus, whose great work, teaching that the earth is not the centre of the universe, was to remain under ban of the Council of the Inauisition until fifteen centuries after the Nicene victory, the record of astronomical progress in all Christendom may most charitably be expressed in the following terms:' whereupon follow four blank pages! , 303-303) . I t appears that in the meantime arrangements had already been concluded with the firm of A. Hermann to publish the integral works of Duhem, including the remaining volumes of the Systdme du M o d e . I t is difficult to foretell the effect which these volumes will produce. They may well have lost much of their significance and originality through the delay.
4 Cf. R. Ginsburg, 'Duhem and Jordanus Nemorarius,' Isis, xxv (1936 achievements of the English, the Germans and the Italians, even as far back as the Middle Ages. We sense the animus of a Catholic frustrated in his academic ambitions by a hostile educational machine, eager to vindicate the scientific traditions of his Church. Finally we recall that he was a brilliant physicist in his own right, who approached the history of science primarily to establish the background, and to discover 'precursors' of his own discipline. And yet when this bias has been corrected, we are left with the realization that Duhem deserves the enormous credit of having opened a new field of scholarship. He was the first to fray an unbroken vista backward into the mediaeval antecedents of modern science.
The other important survey of this field, Professor Thorndike's History of Magic and Experimental Science, is animated by a different spirit.' Professor Thorndike is primarily an historian. He is less concerned than Sarton or Duhem with chronicling the advance of positive scientific knowledge. He is interested rather in the quasidialectical process by which the two elements indicated in the title of his book have gradually converged. For him, alchemy, astrology and the search for occult virtues -which others might regard as superstition rather than science -are the principal avenues through which man has gradually, and often obliquely, approached his present knowledge and mastery of Nature. Philosophy and mathematics recede to a secondary plane. In contrast with Duhem, Thorndike's sound training as an historian has led him to a cautious interpretation of fourteenth and fifteenth century science. His insistence on replacing the 'isolated geniuses' and the 'precursors' back into the context of their age, a t times approaches close to 'debunking,' but on the whole his distrust of unfounded generalization has proved a healthful sceptici~m.~ I t would be incorrect to state that Duhem and Thorndike have consistently presented opposing views. Nevertheless one might well affirm that between them they have established a sort of thesis-antithesis interpretation of late mediaeval science. I t seems inevitable that future workers in the field will be tempted to use their investigations as the basis for a new synthesis. I t would be presumptuous in the present paper to lay down the lines which such a synthesis must follow. I
shall limit myself to a single instance of the way inwhich a fourteenth-century man of science may be used to illustrate the transition from mediaeval to modern thought. For methodological reasons I have selected a figure who has been treated in some detail by both Thorndike and Duhem.
1 A history of magic and experimental science. Vols I, 11 (New York, 1929) ; 111, IV (New York, 1934 Nicole Oresme, Bishop of Lisieux, friend and adviser of King Charles v, was unquestionably one of the most talented and versatile men of the later Middle Ages. Although highly regarded in his own day, the reputation which he now enjoys has largely been established since the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1867 Francois Meunier published what still remains the only full length portrait of the man.' Oresme's fame grew rapidly. Historians discovered in his De origine, nalura, jure et mutationibus monetarum an apparent anticipation of Gresham's law.2 Subsequent criticism has gradually whittled away most of the substance of this 'precursorship,' but there were other claims to be made. In the late 1860's Maximilian Curtze -whom we might describe as the 'precursor of Duhem' -initiated the study of Oresme's mathematical writing^.^ He was able to establish the fact that Oresme was the first writer systematically to develop an equivalent of our modern fractional exponents; so far as I know the credit for this innovation has not been impaired. Curtze also called attention to a Tractatus de latitudinibus formarum which described a method of representing quasi-functional variations by means of simple geometrical diagram^.^ On the strength of this treatise Curtze proclaimed Oresme as the 'precursor of Descartes' in the invention of analytical geometry. This has proved, on the whole, the most viable of Oresme's 'precursorships. ' The consolidation of Oresme's reputation as a scientist was the work of Pierre Duhem. In 1909 Duhem published a long extract from Oresme's French commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo in which the commentator had advanced arguments in favor of a diurnal rotation of the earth.s This notion, which goes back to classical antiquity, is based upon a geocentric, not a heliocentric u n i v e r~e .~ T'inci (1913) to reinforce Curtze's claim that the 'latitude of forms' diagrams constituted an anticipation of Descartes.' R e then added the final crown. On the basis of a detailed analysis of fourteenth-century theories of motion -particularly the concept of impetus -Duhem affirmed that Oresme had clearly foreshadowed the principle of inertia and the law of falling b o d i e~.~ He was the precursor not merely of Copernicus and Descartes, but also of Galileo. To Duhem, eager to diminish the reputation of the great Italian whom his Church had reproved, this was a felicitous climax! For twenty years subsequent work on Oresme as a scientist very largely took the form of footnoting Duhem. Sometimes, indeed, the tenor of this work was distinctly critical. I n 1914 Heinrich Wieleitner published excerpts of the manuscript transcriptions which Duhem had used in his Etudes.3 He rejected the claim that Oresme's graphic representation of 'functions' constituted an equivalent of analytical geometry, and denied that it could have exercised a decisive influence on Descartes, whose inspiration came rather from a more intensive study of the Greek mathematical classics.* On the other hand Wieleitner also examined the scholastic theories of falling bodies, and in this case was able to substantiate the importance which Duhem had attached to the pre-Galilean t r a d i t i~n .~ Wieleitner was followed by Ernst Borchert whose monograph on Oresme's concept of motion (1934) presented the first thoroughly critical examination of the ~u b j e c t .~ Although he shades the picture more conservatively than Duhem, Borchert also affirms that Oresme arrived a t a conception of impetus remarkably close to the modern theory.' 1 $tzcdes sur Lkonard de P'inci: 3" sCrie, Les pre'czcrsezcrs parisiens de Galilde (Paris, 1913) Mittelalters, x x x~, Zbicl., pp. 100-111; cf. ' W e schon bei allen eben er6rterten Fragen die Spannungen in ihm zwischen den Lehren der Tradition und der eigenen Uberzeugung immer gr6sser wurden, so steht in dieser letzten Teilfrage, die zugleich die Gesamtfrage unserer Untersuchung bedeutet, Oresme in dem fiihlbaren Gegensatz des ihm dargebotenen unvollkommenen Schwerebegriffs und seiner klaren Formulierung des Impetus als der Qualitas des bervegten Karpers, fur dessen Bewegung sie sein inneres reales
The year 1934 also marked the appearance of another important study of Oresme, presenting him, this time, from an entirely different angle. We have seen that for a period of seventy-five years -from Curtze to Borchert -scholars in this field had been primarily interested in Oresme's activity as a precursor of scientific discoveries ordinarily attributed to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Professor Lynn Thorndike in the third volume of his History of Magic and Ezperinzental Science devoted three chapters to an aspect of Oresme which had generally been neglected, viz.; his attitude toward esoteric science, astrology and natural magic.' From Thorndike's account Oresme emerges less as a 'precursor,' more as a typical, though indeed outstanding 'man of his age.' We see him as one of the shrewdest among mediaeval critics of astrology, and yet himself astonishingly credulous of much of the pseudo-science which had been current for c e n t u r i e~.~ Thorndike's characterization of Oresme goes far to neutralize the enthusiastic claims of Duhem. And yet it is by no means necessary to suppose that the two interpretations are contradictory. I t would be more accurate to regard them as constituting two dimensions of the man -as Oresme might have put it, a 'qualitas superficialis.' I t is natural to wonder whether a third dimension might not be added, constituting a 'qualitas corporalis.' I shall attempt to indicate in summary fashion the direction in which such a dimension might be imagined to extend.
Although each of the numerous 'precursorships' attributed to Oresme invites our scrutiny, I shall limit myself to one, the alleged anticipation of Descartes.
The case for this 'precursorship' rests largely on two texts, the Tractatus de latitudinibus formarunz investigated by Curtze, and the Tractatus de configuratione qualitaturn studied by Duhem, Wieleitner and Borchert. Of the two the latter is by far the more important. Although it exists in a t least a dozen manuscripts the De conjiguratione qualitatunz has never been published as a whole.3 What is perhaps Fundament darstellt.' (p. 111). -A somewhat different interpretation is presented by A. KoyrB in a group of important articles: 'A l'aurore de la science moderne (la jeunesse de Galilke), ' Annales de I'Vniversite' de Paris, x (1935) , 540-551; XI (1936), 33-56; 'La loi de la chute des corps; GalilCe et Descartes,' Revue Philosophique, LXII (1937), 149-204 . Koyrk divides the history of physical theory into three periods: 1) Aristotelian physics, 2) physics of impetus (Buridan, Oresme), 3) mathematicoexperimental physics (Galileo). This last phase, which was precipitated by the sixteenth-century Renaissance of Archimedes, constitutes in Koyrk's opinion an 'intellectual mutation,' non-continuous with mediaeval physics; 'A l'aurore de la science moderne,' pp. 544-545.
Ch. x x v , 'Oresme on astrology,' x x v~, 'Oresme on magic,' X X~I I , 'Oresme on nature.' Cf. also by the same author 'Coelestinus' summary of Nicholas Oresme on marvels,' Osiris, I (1936) We are left then with as much as a fifth or a quarter of the De conjiguratione qualitaturn which no serious student has found useful.' We see that this work which Oresme, himself, clearly regarded as one of his major achievements, has apparently never been studied as a whole. I t will be worth our while to enquire whether any essential part of Oresme's total thought has been sacrificed by this concentration on partial aspects. The Tractatus de conjiguratione qualitatunz is divided into three parts. Part I commences with a careful account of the method by which Oresme proposes to represent the variations of qualities through geometrical diagrams. I t is this section which has chiefly attracted the attention of those interested in Oresme as a mathematician. Although the method itself has been satisfactorily described by Wieleitner, Duhem and Borchert, the precise nature of Oresme's innovation has been imperfectly set forth. Fortunately an earlier writing, which appears to have been overlooked hitherto, enables us to penetrate into the process of thought by which Oresme arrived a t his new conception. This text, a set of Questiones on the Geometria of Euclid, deals with a number of topics current in fourteenthcentury scholastic mathematics, notably proportion, incommensurability and irrationality."t differs from other works of similar character, however, in that it (Paris, BibliothAque Nationale, Fonds Latin, Ms. 14579) and that which Duhem transcribed and Wieleitner published (B. N., Ms. lat. 7371). -I am at present engaged in preparing a critical edition of the Tractatus de configz~ratione qzcalitatum. 1 I t is indeed true that this and other sections of the Tractatus de configzcratione qz~alitatzcm qu ere examined even before the publication of Meunier's biography; cf. Abbe Picard, 'Dissertation sur un trait6 philosophique de Nicolas Oresme,' Prbcis analytiqzce des travaz~x de 1'Acadkmie des Sciences, Belles-lettres, et Arts de Rouen (1851-1853), 456-475. The essentially antiquarian character of this account is sufficiently indicated by the laudatory remarks on p. 458: 'La matiiire, au premier aspect, est abstraite et aride, mais j'ose esp6rer qu'elle ne vous paraftra pas sans intCr&t, soit parce que I'auteur appartient h. notre province soit parce qu'on aime revenir, du moins de temps en temps, sur ce qui autrefois pr6occupa vivement nos phres, soit enfin parce que, dans les choses du pass&, on trouve souvent des rapports assez piquants avec les choses prbsentes.' attempts to combine the study of geometrical figures with elaborations of the non-geometrical latitudo formarunt, such as had become commonplace through the subtle Calculationes of Richard Suiseth.' In a confused and haphazard form these Questiones present a number of ideas and principles which are identical with those developed more systematically in the D e conjiguratione qualitatum.
The method by which Oresme proposes to fuse the mathematical and the logical approach to the study of 'forms' may be summarized as follows : a given base line, drawn horizontally, is taken to represent the extension, either in time or in space, of a subject whose properties, e.g., whiteness, density, luminosity, are to be determined. This line is divided into equal units called degrees. For each degree of extension or longitudo a certain degree of intensity or strength in the subject may be measured. This is represented by a vertical line generally called a l a t i t u d~.~ When all the latitudes have been plotted on a uniform scale, a line may be drawn connecting their summits. A geometrical figure is thus obtained which Oresme calls the linear configuration of the quality or 'form' in question. -4 similar construction projected horizontally into the third dimension yields the figure of a qualitas superjcialis. We need not follow Oresme in his ingenious development of this conception, which leads him to an implied regret that he has no fourth dimension at his disposal in order to represent the qualitas corporalis.3
The theoretical discussion of the technique of graphing the latitude of forms, as we have summarized it, occupies the first twenty-one chapters of Part I in the Tractatus. The rest of Part I (chapters 82to 40) contains applications of the technique to the study of 'permanent' or, as we might say, static phenomena. I t is this section of the D e conjguratione qualitatum which no one appears to have used, and which we must presently return to examine. Part 11, the next division of the Tractatus, like Part I , falls into two main sections. Chapters 1 to 10 continue the theoretical discussion with reference to the study of motion and velocity; they have been used by Duhem, Wieleitner and Borchert. Then follow some thirty chapters detailing the application of the configuration principle to 'res succesivas' ' On the 'Calculator' Richard Suiseth see Thorndike's chapter in Magtc and experimental science, 111, 370-385. Thorndike states that a critical edition of this influential work is to be desired. The Calcz~lationeshave been studied by Carl Boyer, The concepts of the c z l~~l u s ; a critical and historical discz~ssion of the derivative and the differential ( N~T T York, 1939), pp. 69-79. How the terms 'latitudo' and 'longitudo' came to be used in this connection is by no means clear. The suggestion that they may have been derived from geographical coordinates is rejected by Wieleitner, 'Der Tractatz~s de latitudinibz~s formarz~m,' p. 135. Wieleitner seems to favor a derivation through the purely philosophical tradition. I t seems to me, however, that the possibility of an influence from scientific terminology is not excluded, if not from geography, a t least from astronomy. Thus we find that 'degrees' and 'minutes' ere used in the measurement of qualities and virtues by Walter of Odington early in the fourteenth century; cf. Thorndike Although nearly all the scholastic philosophers, including such august figures as Aquinas and Scotus, were thus fully acquainted with classical atomism, with few exceptions they agreed in rejecting the doctrine. In part this rejection was motivated by respect for the authority of the Philosopher and for the cogency of his arguments. In part it sprang from dread of the materialistic implications of the Democritean physics, and of the heterodox conclusions to which it inevitably led.
The force of both of these restraining considerations was greatly weakened during the fourteenth century. I t was natural that the critical and skeptical bias of nominalism should incline Occam and some of his followers to a sympathetic scrutiny of the arguments for atomism which Aristotle had undertaken to refute.' In Occam himself this tendency was only implicit. The keen edge of his 'razor' by slicing away the distinction between substance and accident laid bare an inner core of materialism which was eventually to prove fatal to Christian philosophy. Bold minds did not hesitate to draw perilous conclusions, and these in turn were swiftly met with the defensive weapon of ecclesiastical condemnation. In 1346 Nicolas dYAutrecourt, the worst offender, was compelled to burn his writings publicly, and to recant his radical theses of which more than one was tainted with atomism.2
The impact of this condemnation might well have discouraged further traffic in such dangerous notions. And yet there is evidence that atomism continued to attract attention at the University of Paris, and ~recisely in the intellectual circles where Oresme must have moved. We learn from Jean Buridan, twice rector of the University, and a close associate of Oresme, that there were those in his day who held an ancient opinion of the pre-Aristotelians, viz., that there was no such thing as an 'accident,' and that matter, 'taliter et taliter figurata vel formata,' constituted the whole entity of natural thing^.^ Is it possible that this reference to atomism by Buridan, who was himself hostile to the doctrine, was occasioned by the writings of Oresme? Or was Oresme merely echoing a tradition which had persisted a t the University despite the condemnation of 1346? Unfortunately the evidence a t hand does not permit of a positive answer. We shall confine ourselves, therefore, to the relation between the passage quoted above, and the general context of the Tractatus de configuratione qualitatum.
We may begin with a note of caution. The reference to classical atomism at the beginning of chapter 22 stands in isolation. Although the same notion is applied to the study of natural 'passion' in chapter 23, there is no other direct allusion to atoms in the treatise. This reticence may indicate either that Oresme attached little importance to the discussion, or else that he was wary of ecclesiastical censure.' On the other hand it is difficult to escape the impression that Oresme regarded the matter as of more than casual interest. For it is precisely at this point, I believe, that the real novelty of his whole approach may be detected.
Taking our cue from Buridan's statement that there were those who believed matter to be 'figured or formed thus and so' on the basis of views held prior to Aristotle, we may turn to the text of the De Generatione et Corruptione (I, 2, 315b, 6-16) .2 Aristotle is discussing the views of his predecessor concerning growth, alteration, action and passion. For the most part, he declares, these earlier explanations have been unsatisfactory. Only one deserves serious consideration :
Demokritos and Leukippos, however, postulate the 'figures' and make 'alteration' and coming-to-be result from them. They explain coming-to-be and passing-away by their dissociation and association, but 'alteration' by their 'grouping' and position. And since they thought that the truth lay in the appearance, and the appearances are conflicting and infinitely many, they made the 'figures' infinite in number. Hence -owing to the change of the compound -the same thing seems different and conflicting to many people; it is 'transposed' by a small additional ingredient, and appears utterly other by the 'transposition' of a single constituent. For Tragedy and Comedy are both composed of the same letters.
Two passages from the De Caelo also merit attention: According to the same thinkers, 'the atoms differ in figure, and all figures are composed of pyramids, rectilinear in the case of rectilinear figures, while the sphere has eight pyramidal parts ' (111, 4, 303a, 30-30313, 2) . 'Those who start from fire as the single element, while avoiding this difficulty, involve themselves in many others. Some of them give fire a particular shape, like those who make it a pyramid . . . The reason given may be -more crudely -that the pyramid is the most piercing of figures as fire is of bodies ' (111, 5,304a, 8-13) .
There can be little doubt that these passages must have been in Oresme's mind when he wrote the two chapters on the influence of 'configuration' in natural actions and passions. In any study of Oresme, whether as a scientist or as a politi-hTicole Oresme and Jlodern Science cal and economic theorist, we must keep in mind the fact that his intellectual foundations were deeply embedded in the Aristotelian corpus. At least half of his writings take the form of commentaries on Aristotle's works, among them the two which we have just cited.l We must also recall that Oresme belonged to a generation which had mastered virtually the entire substance of the Stagirite's teaching. The commentator of this late period, therefore, was either reduced to the sterile repetition of familiar points, or impelled to wrest new and subtIer interpretations from his text. To a thinker as fertile and ingenious as Oresme the second alternative was naturally the more a t t r a c t i~e .~ We may say, then, that the atomistic explanation of the structure of natural things was suggested to Oresme primarily through his study of Aristotle. To a large extent it partook of the character of paradox, a notion to be played with, like the diurnal rotation of the earth, 'par e~batement.'~ And yet we may suspect that there was something more. The genius of Oresme's mind lay in its facility for combining ideas, for detecting inter-relations between fields of thought which more pedestrian thinkers had failed to note. I t is this impulse toward the unification of scattered fragments in the study of nature which led Oresme to compose the Tractatus de configuratione qualitatunz.
The term 'configuration' itself gives us, I believe, the key to Oresme's intuition.
We see that it came to him from two main sources. First, the study of various mathematical works, especially Euclid, had led him to imagine a means of representing concretely that 'latitude of forms' which in earlier and contemporary writings had been essentially logical and abstract. In this sense 'figure' constituted a graphic pattern which aided the student to visualize the order and intensity of properties in natural objects, and the character of the process by which they underwent variation. ' Figure' in this sense, however, bore no direct relation to the actual distribution of parts, or to the causal mechanism by which change took place. I t was an aid to the study of nature, not a rationale of its inner structure.
The other sense of the term 'figure' appears to have been that which was sug-gested in the passage from the De Generatione quoted above. Whether or not the original atomism of Democritus was in fact both 'geometrical' and 'physical' -a point which is still in dispute -to Oresme it certainly suggested the possibility that the two orders might be combined, a possibility which Aristotle had denied.' The opening lines of the Tractatus appear to warrant such an interpretation: 'Every measurable thing except numbers is imagined in the manner of a continuous quantity. Therefore it is fitting to imagine for its measurement points, lines, and surfaces or the properties of those things, in which, as the Philosopher says, measure or proportion is immediately to be found . . . And whether or not there be such things as indivisible points, nevertheless it is appropriate to imagine them in mathematical fashion, in order to know the measure of things and their proportion^.'^ The problem of interpreting this passage is rather delicate; there are significant differences among the manuscripts as to the precise wording, which further shade its meaning in the direction of a m b i g~i t y .~ Nevertheless when these lines are taken together with those quoted from chapter 22, it seems that they assume a very broad significance. Without forcing, I believe we may say that they represent a conception, which, however limited and confused, is substantially novel. What Oresme is groping toward is a theory of the relation between the actual order, shape and disposition of the imperceptible particles which make up natural objects, and the geometrical figures which will be obtained when their active and passive qualities are represented according to their extension and intension. In other words the shape and pattern of the diagram bear an immediate one-to-one correspondence, not only to the actual shape of the object in question and its constituent parts, but also to the various properties which it possesses.
Oresme's theory of configuration is indeed halting and obscure. Although supported by specific instances, these are hardly of a nature to compel our assent. They are either conjectural and abstract, or fanciful and remote. They fail to provide any sanction of experimental verification according to modern conceptions. Moreover Oresme himself concedes that he has presented nothing more than an hypothesis. Natural phenomena, he admits, may well be explainable in other terms than the 'configuration' of particles and velocities. I t is sufficient for him if such an explanation be p~ssible.~ Florence, Ashb. 210, f. 102I, 'Omnis res mensurabilis exceptis numeris ymaginatur ad modum quantitatis continue, ideo oportet pro eius mensuracione ymaginari puncta lineas et superficies aut istarum proprietates in quibus, ut vult Philosophus, mensura seu proporcio per prius reperitur . . .Et si nichil sint puncta indivisibilia aut linee, tamen oportet ea mathematice fingere pro rerum mensuris et earum proporcionibus cognoscendis.' Thus Paris, Ms. lat. 14579, f. 18-as quoted by Borchert (p. 93) gives the word 'vel' instead of 'nichil' in the passage quoted above. In my translation the phrase 'whether or not there be such things' appears to take account of both these readings. Now if our analysis is correct, it is apparent that it is susceptible of a fairly radical interpretation. If we were in the mood of Duhem, looking for a precursor, we might say, here is the forerunner of Descartes indeed, not merely as the inventor of analytical geometry, but as the initiator of the conception that all natural phenomena may be mathematically reduced to magnitude, figure and motion !' So far as I am aware, no such claim has ever been made for Oresme, and I have no intention of advancing it myself. Kevertheless a claim of almost equal scope has recently been asserted. I n a brief but thoughtful passage of his Geschichte der Naturphilosophie (1938) Hugo Dingler has assigned to Oresme a position of pivotal significance in the history of ~cience.~ According to Dingler the speculative tradition of the Greeks had achieved one outstanding triumph; it had succeeded by a tremendous intellectual effort in establishing a solid, rational basis for knowledge of the constant, eternal and unvarying principles of Being. In spite, or because of their success in this endeavor the Greeks had never succeeded in mastering the other fundamental aspect of reality, the sphere of Becoming. I t remained for modern science to perfect and exalt the conception of the dynamic and the variable in Kature. And according to Dingler it was Oresme with his reduction of all phenomena to a successive flux -formae jluentes -measured against the invariant coijrdinate of time, primum omnium successivorum, who took the decisive step.
Substantially this thesis is derived from that of Kurd Lasswitz, as Dingler himself indicates. Lasswitz had seen the process by which modern causal-mechanistic science overcame Greek teleology, as the substitution of the principle of 'variability' for that of 's~bstantiality.'~The precipitating cause of that successful transformation he ascribed to the convergence of atomistic and corpuscular notions of matter with certain aspects of Neoplatonic philosophy during the fifteenth ~e n t u r y .T he pivotal figure from which this new orientation took its start was Nicholas of Cusa. Lasswitz did, indeed, assign a r81e in this process to Oresme, but having a t his disposal only the fragmentary material assembled by Curtze, he was restricted to the consideration of Oresme primarily as a mathernati~ian.~ Cf. E. A. Burtt, The metaphysical foundations of modern physical science (New York, 1927) , Ch. rv, 'Descartes.'
Geschichte der Naturphilosophie (Geschichte der Philosophie i n Langsschnitten, ~I I : Berlin, 1932), p. 7 5 ;also 'Uber die Stellung von Nicolaus Oresme in der Geschichte der TTissenschaften,' Archeion, XI (19%9), suppl. pp. xv-xxiii. So far as I am aware Dingier's interpretation of Oresme is not based upon original research, but rather upon a synthesis of existing secondary material; it is nonetheless remarkable as an attempt to interpret the history of science through the history of philosophy.
3 Lasswitz, op. cit., I, ; cf. such passages as the following with the view of Dingler, 'In allen Erscheinungen besteht das Reale derselbe in ihrer Tendenz zur Fortsetzung in der Zeit' (271).
The importance of Neoplatonism in producing the modern mathematical physics is stressed by Burtt, op. cit., Ch. 11 . Against this may be set the criticism of E. W. Strong, Procedures and metaphysics; a study i n the philosophy of mathematical-physical science i n the sixteenth and seuenteenth centuries (Berkeley, California, 1936) . Strong seesthe advance of mathematical science in sixteenth-century Italy as being inspired by the study of Euclid, rather than of 'metamathematics' of the Pythagorean type. Both Burtt and Strong, I believe, have weakened their accounts by failure to examine the fourteenthcentury mathematical tradition, e.g., such works as the Geometria Speculativa of Bradwardine and the treatise of Oresme. 6 Lasswitz, op. cit., I, 281-282.
Had Lasswitz been able to study the Tractatus de configuratione qualitaturn, he might well have been led to an estimate fully as flattering as that of Dingler. We see, then, that there is substantial authority for crediting Oresme with an outstanding scientific achievement. I t is noteworthy that even Professor Thorndike concedes that he may have occupied a pivotal position between the Greeks and modern science.' The dimension of Oresme's thought which Duhem has indicated is seen to possess reality, even though its precise extent must be revalued. We may now enquire whether the second dimension -the quasi-magical view of Nature which Thorndike has outlined -can also be given further specification.
We have seen that the graphic technique and the corpuscular conception of matter, taken in isolation, invest the Tractatus de conjiguratione qualitaturn with a singularly modern appearance. If we return to the treatise with an eye for the concrete applications, we are immediately struck with a different impression. We have seen that Oresme was wont to illustrate most of his general points with specific examples. As in other contemporary treatises of similar nature, these are usually selected from the conventional scholastic repertory -alteration in whiteness, luminosity, degree of rarefaction, resistance or ~e l o c i t y .~ These in turn are largely derived from Aristotle himself. For the most part they are of a na'ive character, invested with a specious affectation of mathematical precision; they are not based upon what we should call experiment designed to check and verify an hypothesis. What is remarkable in Oresme's treatise is the contrast between the boldness and ingenuity with which he extends the applications of his method, and the generally trivial or far-fetched character of his examples. As we watch him push forward, inspired by a restless imagination and an insistent logic, we realize that the second dimension of his thought is fully as subtle and complex as the first.
The curious penumbra of pseudo-science which permeates the Tractatus de conjiguratione qualitaturn is particularly noticeable in the later chapters of Part I. In chapter 24 Oresme discusses the variations of 'natural virtues' according to their configurations. As examples he cites the contrasting activity and virtue of the natural heat in the lion and the ass, or the particular configuration which makes conception possible in the female womb.3 I n the following chapter he iniliagic and experimental science, 111, 493, ' . ..the attempt of Oresme and Henry of Hesse to apply the current fourteenth century "art of latitudes," theoretical as it was, to the solution of natural problems must be regarded, like the Calculationes of Richard Suiseth, as an important first step towards the development of modern mathematical method and its application to scientific questions. ' Illustrations of this type abound in the so-called 'sophismata physicalia' of the fourteenth century. These logical exercises which grow out of the study of the 'syncategoremata' were particularly popular a t Oxford; Suiseth's Calculationes are closely related to the type. C. Prantl, who pioneered this field in his Geschichte der Logik i m Abendlande, Vol. III (Leipzig, 1867), saw in it nothing but barren waste. Michalski, who is gifted with greater historical perception, suggests that these sophistical discussions, originating in mere grammar, lead through such conceptions as the 'de incipit et desinit, ' and 'maxima' and 'minima' troduces the familiar instances of mandragora and the human fear of snakes. These may be better explained through configuration of occult but strictly natural virtues, than through the incorporeal spirits of the necr0mancers.l I n chapter 26 Oresme develops still another consequence of his theory. Figures, in addition to possessing active and passive virtues, also display the quality of beauty or its oppo~ite.~ Precisely as some musical intervals are more consonant than others, so the pattern of natural qualities within a given species is susceptible of intension and remission in the degree of pulchritude and nobility. We have thus approached an aesthetic conception of nature strongly reminiscent of Pythagoreanism and Platonism. But Oresme does not leave us here. Not only are configurations variable in their approximation to perfect harmony, rationality and beauty; they are also subject to a principle of attraction and repulsion, or as Oresme puts it, natural 'amicitia' and 'inimi~itia.'~ Through the configuration of the due proportion of qualities in each species, we may explain the enmity between the wolf and the sheep, or the friendship between man and dog! By this point Oresme's theory has swept him far beyond the corpuscular materialism implied in chapters 22 and 23. The infinite variety of 'figures,' which, as we have seen, was impressed upon him with the notions of Democritus, now serves as an explanation of psychological phenomena such as the relativity of pleasure and pain.4 The same principle is used to account for the 'difformity' of the sensitive and the cognitive faculties, and ultimately even for the soul's capacity to behold visions and see into the future as in a mirror, clearly or darkly, in true or in distorted aspect.6
MTe must not suppose that these discussions of configuration in the 'res permanentes' are of an accidental or subordinate nature. As we have noted the second half of Part 11 contains an even more extensive application of the principle of configuration to the study of 'res successivas.' In chapters 11 and 12 the 'pulchritude of velocities' and the commensurability of celestial motions are di~cussed.~ activus et alterius virtutis quam calor naturalis asini vel leonis (P), non solum quia est intensior vel remissior vel aliqua tali differencia, sed quia secundum intencionem aliter et dissimiliter figuratur . . . A group of eight chapters (15 to 22) outlines a theory of musical aesthetics in terms of configuration.' This leads by a not illogical transition to the lengthy discussion of magic which Professor Thorndike has summarized. Part 11, like Part I, concludes on a psychological theme, the 'difformity' of spiritual pleasures and pains. Configurations of consonance, harmony and concord determine the pattern of joy and delectation eternally experienced by the blessed angels, precisely as the disposition of particles determines the degree of receptivity to heat in a tin basin !2 This, then, is the second dimension of Oresme's thought. I t is a bewildering agglomeration of optics, music, aesthetics, occult virtues, demonology, natural magic and psychology. I t is pieced together from the most disparate sources, from Boethius and Vitelo, from Platonic and Neoplatonic texts, from Avicenna and Algazel, from occult literature, and even from Aristotle h i m~e l f .~ How are we to regard this second dimension in comparison with the first? May we say that the one represents the 'man of his age,' the other the 'precursor'? If so, where shall we look for a third dimension which will integrate and give relief and substance to the other two?
A full answer to these questions cannot be given in a paper of this scope. The complexity of the problem to which we have directed our attention -the transition from mediaeval to modern science -forcibly suggests that no unitary solution is now possible. A satisfactory conception of that particular process -and in all probability of similar transitions in other ages -can only be achieved by simultaneously following a number of separate, non-converging types of approach. One of these types is that of Ideengeschichte, the isolation by a subtle analysis of irreducible components of thought which persist through various ages and cultures.%lnother approach is that of the sociologically trained historian who sees tiones super Geometriain Eurlidis, as we have seen, devote considerable attention to the proportion of the side of a square to the diagonal. Oresme also wrote a Tractatus de commensurabilitate (or incommensurabilitate) motutrm celestium which resolves itself into an allegorical debate between Arithmetic and Geometry in which the latter stresses the beauty of the irrational proportion and the cosmic plenitude which it implies; cf. Thorndike, ~Tfagic and experimental science, 111, [404] [405] [406] ; this discussion appears to have taken its inspiration from Boethius.
Zbid., f. l25", ' . . .habet itaque creatura beata simul duas delectaciones vel plures, quarum una est principalior et simpliciter uniformis et quasi gravior sicud tenor in cantu. Alia vero vel alie sunt difformes difformitate pulcerrima consonancia armonica et concordi, sive igitur sit alia melodia sicud tactum est capitulo 8.4, sive non.' I t lies beyond the scope of the present paper to trace the influences of these sources. We may content ourselves with pointing out the influence of Vitelo, not only on the optical and aesthetic side of Oresme's discussion, but also on the demonological; cf. A. Birkenmaier, 'Studya nad Witelonem,' Archizmm do Badania HistorjiFilozojjiw Polsce, 11, i (1981) , 1-149. I t is unfortunate that the ordinary scholar can derive little profit from this important study, apart from the Latin texts which it contains, e.g., Oresme's Questiones Meteorarum, I I I ,~(pp. 53-70) . Tantalizingly brief r6sumi.s of Birkenmaier's studies are given under the heading 'Etudes sur Witelo' in Bulletin international de I'Acade'mie Polonaise, cl. de philol., cl. d'hist. et de philos. (1918), 4-6; (1919 -1920 (l98.%), 6-9 . T h i s approach is illustrated with singular brilliance in A. 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being; a study ofthe history of an idea (Cambridge, Mass., 1936) .
